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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

BEDNAR V. PROVIDENT BANK OF MD., INC.: A CLOSING
COST REIMBURSEMENT CHARGE WAS AN INVALID
PREPAYMENT CHARGE IN CONNECTION WITH AN
EARLIER HOME LOAN FEATURING A CLOSING COST
WAIVER REPAYMENT.
By: Ryan McQuighan
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that when a buyer repays a
home loan before the three-year term required by his closing cost
waiver, the bank's imposition of the prior closing costs at settlement
results in an invalid prepayment charge. Bednar v. Provident Bank of
Md., Inc., 402 Md. 532, 937 A.2d 210 (2007). The Court further
determined that such a charge violates Maryland's prohibition against
prepayment charges if a bank requires a borrower to repay the charge
if he closes the account before three years. Id. at 532, 937 A.2d at
210.
Andrew Bednar ("Bednar") obtained a second mortgage from
Provident Bank of Maryland ("Provident") in August 2003. Along
with the loan and security agreement, Bednar signed a "Closing Cost
Waiver Certificate." The terms of the certificate provided that if
Bednar closed his account during the first three years, the closing cost
waiver would be rescinded and closing costs would be added to any
balance due on the account. At settlement, the $681.00 closing costs
were paid by Provident, the settlement statement indicated the same,
and Bednar did not pay any closing costs in connection with the loan.
Two years later, Bednar refinanced and paid off the Provident loan.
At that settlement, Provident collected the outstanding balance of the
loan plus the $681.00 charge Provident waived for Bednar's first loan.
Bednar filed a class action complaint in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City, alleging a violation of the Credit Grantor Closed End
Credit Provisions ("CLEC") of section 12 of the Commercial Law
Article of the Maryland Code; the Consumer Protection Act ("CPA")
of section 13-300 of the Commercial Law Article of the Maryland
Code; the Interest and Usury laws; and the Secondary Mortgage Loan
Law.
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On Provident's motion to dismiss, the circuit court dismissed the
causes of action under the Interest and Usury laws and the Secondary
Mortgage Loan Law and denied Provident's motion to dismiss the
CLEC and CPA causes of action. However, the court granted
Provident's motion for summary judgment on the CLEC and CPA
causes of action and found that the closing fees were not imposed as a
penalty for prepayment of the loan. Therefore, Provident did not
violate either the CLEC or the CPA.
Bednar filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland. Before that court considered the case, Bednar petitioned
for a writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Provident
filed a cross-petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted Bednar's petition and denied Provident's cross-petition.
The Court began by stating that the parties were free to argue the
merits of the Consumer Protection claim because the trial court did not
reach the issue of certain CPA violations that were independent of
CLEC violations asserted. Bednar, 402 Md. at 543, 937 A.2d at 216.
After hearing these arguments, the Court determined that the $681.00
charge was "plainly" a prepayment charge in violation of the CPA.
Bednar, 402 Md. at 543, 937 A.2d at 216. Section l2-1009(e) of the
Commercial Law Article prohibits a lender from imposing any
prepayment charge. Bednar, 402 Md. at 543, 937 A.2d at 216. The
Court stated that reading an exception into section 12-1 009(e) to allow
Provident to impose a prepayment charge would violate the basic rules
of statutory construction. Bednar, 402 Md. at 544, 937 A.2d at 21617.
Next, the Court discussed a similar case entitled Goldman v. First
Federal Savings and Loan Association, which held that when a charge
was conditioned on prepayment, that charge was, in effect, a
prepayment charge. Bednar, 402 Md. at 544, 937 A.2d at 217 (citing
Goldman v. First Fed. Savs. and Loan Ass'n, 518 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir.
1975)). The $681.00 charge was a prepayment charge pursuant to
Goldman because it would not have been owed if the loan was paid at
maturity. Bednar, 402 Md. at 545, 937 A.2d at 217. Section 121023 (b)(3) of the Commercial Law Article states that agreements may
not contain provisions purporting to waive rights under the CLEC
subtitle, subject to certain exceptions. Bednar, 402 Md. at 545, 937
A.2d at 217. In addition, section 12-1 023(b)(4)(i) of the Commercial
Law Article renders any clause within an agreement or note in
violation of section 12-1023(b)(3) unenforceable. Bednar, 402 Md. at
545, 937 A.2d at 217. Therefore, the Court held that Provident's
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"Closing Cost Waiver Certificate" was unenforceable and Bednar
could prepay his loan without the penalty. /d. at 545, 937 A.2d at 217.
The Court stated that Provident's theories about the imposition of
the charge could not justify the collection. Id. at 545, 937 A.2d at 217.
The lender waived the charge on the condition that the borrower could
not prepay in three years, but the requirement to repay those closing
costs was a prepayment charge under the CLEC. Bednar, 402 Md. at
546, 937 A.2d at 218. The Court stated that calling the charge a
"recapture" was improper because an entity cannot evade a law by
using a "different label for the prohibited conduct." Id. at 546, 937
A.2d at 218. Normally, the Court gives an administrative agency's
interpretation and application of a statute that it administers great
weight, but only when statutory language is ambiguous. !d. at 546-47,
937 A.2d at 218 (quoting Macke Co. v. Comptroller, 302 Md. 18,2223, 485 A.2d 254, 256-57 (1984)). The Court noted that Provident's
reliance on the Office of the Maryland Commissioner of Financial
Regulation's interpretation of section 12-1 009(e) was mistaken
because the statute is clear and unambiguous. Bednar, 402 Md. at
547,937 A.2d at 218.
The outcome of this case suggests that attorneys conducting
settlements ought to take notice of banks that may continue to impose
closing costs in accordance with waiver terms. In addition, the Court
highlights the deference it usually gives to an administrative agency's
interpretation of Maryland law. However, attorneys should be aware
that the Court will not follow interpretations that are contrary to a
plain reading of such statutes. Finally, attorneys that prepare loan
documents for lenders should be aware of the practice and advise
lenders that closing cost waivers cannot be charged back to the
borrower at a later settlement.

